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International Commercial Arbitration Act, Article 8(1) UNCITRAL Model Law and Public Policy
The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently considered in four cases the operation of Article 8(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration adopted in Ontario by the International Commercial Arbitration Act R.S.O. 1990, c-19. In Dancap Productions Inc., v. Key Brand Entertainment, Inc., 2009 ONCA 135 (CanLII) the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal of an order of the motion judge refusing a stay of this action on account of a California arbitration and forum selection clause in one of the contracts made by the parties. Between the hearing of the motion and the appeal the party seeking arbitration obtained an order from the Federal Court in California requiring submission to arbitration of the core issue in the Ontario action. The court observed that a term of the arbitration clause provided, in harmony with Article 16 of the Model Law, that the arbitrator has the authority to determine whether the claims asserted are arbitral and that it is well-established law in Ontario that a court should adopt a deferential approach and grant a stay of an action under Article 8(1) of the Model Law where it is arguable that the dispute falls within the terms of an arbitration agreement. The "general rule" expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC 34 (CanLII) that a challenge to an arbitrator's jurisdiction must be resolved first by the arbitrator unless, if there are questions of fact, only superficial consideration of documentary evidence is required, had not been the approach of either the Ontario motion judge or the California District Court judge, each of whom had assumed jurisdiction themselves. The Ontario Court of Appeal found that motion judge's error was not leaving the issue of whether the dispute was covered the agreement and its arbitration clause to the arbitrator, since it was arguable that it that the arbitration clause governs the core issues in the action and because it clearly called for much more than a "superficial consideration of documentary evidence in the record". In doing so, the court described that in was interpreting the language of the arbitration clause in a generous way which is consistent with the legislative policy which favours arbitration over litigation where the parties so provide by agreement. To be continued...
David Alderson LL.B, LL.M at Heydary Hamilton PC in Toronto, Canada
David Alderson may now be reached at Heydary Hamilton PC on 416 642 2804. Heydary Hamilton PC based in Toronto but also has offices in Mississauga, North York, Ottawa and Chicago. The members of the firm are qualified Canadian lawyers, U.S. attorneys and patent & trade-mark agents. You are cordially invited to read David legal biography page on the Heydary Hamilton PC website (click here).
Criteria to Enforce Request for International Judicial Assistance (Letters Rogatory) - Public Policy - Specificity of Request
The Ontario Court of Appeal in reasons released on September 28, 2006 in Presbytarian Church of Sudan v. Rybiak considered whether Ontario courts should give effect to a request for international judicial assistance from the United States District Court. At first instance Pitt J. granted the request, deciding that neither the Canadian government's policy concerns with the underlying American litigation nor the burden placed on the appellant by the request were sufficieint to warrant its rejection. The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, whilst agreeing with the court below that Canadian public policy did not bar the request, holding that the request was framed in terms so broad and general that the record could not sustain a finding that what is sought could reasonably be relevant or necessary to the issues in the litigation or could not otherwise be obtained. The request for judicial assistance arouse out of a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking to rely upon the Alien Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. Sec 1350), being American legislation passed in 1789 by the first Congress of the United States, which is comprised of one sentence which reads: "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."The request for international judicial assitance was made during the pre-trial stage of that civil action. The respondents applied to the Superior Court of Ontario pursuant to s. 60 of the Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E 26 and ss. 46 and 47 of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C.5., for an order granting the request and ordering the appellant to produce documents and attend to be examined. He opposed the application. The reasons describe that the only affidavit filed in the Superior Court of Ontario in support of the application is that of New York counsel stating that his belief is that the evidence sought is relevant, necessary for trial and not otherwise obtainable. The Ontario Court of Appeal considered whether enforcing the request would be contrary to the public policy of Canada as expressed in a diplomatic note Canada delivered to the United States in respect of the action, expressing two fundemental concerns, namely (i) Canada's opposition in principle to broad assertions of extra territorial jurisdiction over Canadian individuals and entities arising out of activities that take place entirely outside of the state asserting jurisdiction; and (ii) Canada's concern that it's trade incentives to encourage peaceful solutions in Sudan will be rendered impotent by the litigation. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the enforcement of the foreign request does not contravene the public policy of Canada since: - Canada's diplomatic note expressed concerns about the underlying litigation and not judicial assistance; - Those expressed concerns will remain whether or not the requested judicial assistance is enforced in Ontario; - The diplomatic note does not go so far as to say that if the American court determines that it has jurisdiction it would nonetheless contravene Canada's public policy for Canadian courts to accept jurisdiction for the purposes of deciding upon the request for judicial assistance; and - The case was distinquishable from Westinghouse Electric Corporation and Dusquesne Light Co (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 273 (H.C.), where it was the disclosure of the information sought and not the underlying nature of the foreign litigation, that constituted the fatal violation of Canadian public policy. However, the Court of Appeal found that the judge erred in failing to meaningfully address the criteria set out in Fecht v. Deloitte & Touche (1996), 28 O.R. (3d) 188 at 194, aff'd (1997) 32 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.) that before an order giving effect to letters rogatory will be made, the evidence (including the letters rogatory) must establish that: (1) the evidence sought is relevant; (2) the evidence sought is necessary for trial and will be adduced at trial, if admissible; (3) the evidence is not otherwise obtainable; (4) the order sought is not contrary to public policy; (5) the documents sought are identified with reasonable specificity; (6) the order sought is not unduly burdensome, having in mind what the relevant witnesses would be required to do, and produce, were the action to be tried here. The Court of Appeal held that the respondents did not establish that the evidence sought from the appellant is relevent, necessary or otherwise not obtainable, stressing the importance of these criteria, stating: -without some showing of relevance, the court may be sanctioning a fishing expedition and requiring one of its citizens to participate in a process that may be of no assistance to the foreign litigation; -the requirement that the evidence not be otherwise obtainable is to protect the target examinee from having to assume an unfair burden in the process, by identifying more precisely, and narrowing, what it is necessary to pursue in the letters rogatory exercise; The Court of appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the application to enforce the request for international judicial assistance. Corresponding A l d e r s o n practice areasInternational LitigationInternational AssistanceIf you require legal advice about the implications of recent Ontario international and cross-border litigation decisions, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by telephone 416 619 0086 or by email contact@alderson.ca
Products Liability Litigation - Fire Injury - Causation
The unanimous decision of the the Supreme Court of Canada in Resurfice Corp. v Hanke, 2007 SCC 7, delivered on February 8, 2007 in setting aside the order of the Alberta Court of Appeal and restoring the trial judgment, described the test for causation in tort where there are multiple independant causes of harm. In finding that the Alberta Court of Appeal erred in failing to recognize that the basic test for causation remains the "but for" test and applying instead the "material contribution" test in circumstances where it was neither necessary or justified, the Supreme Court of Cananda stated the general principles that emerge form the cases as follows: 1. The basic, fundemental and primary test for determining causation in negligence remains the “but for” test: the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that “but for” the negligent act or omission of each defendant, the injury would not have occurred. Then, contributory negligence may be apportioned, as permitted by statute. The “but for” test recognizes that compensation for negligent conduct should only be made “where a substantial connection between the injury and defendant’s conduct” is present. It ensures that a defendant will not be held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries where they “may very well be due to factors unconnected to the defendant and not the fault of anyone" 2. However, in special circumstances, where it would offend basic notions of fairness and justice to deny liability by applying a “but for” approach, the law has recognized exceptions to the basic “but for” test and applied a “material contribution” test. The cases in which the “material contribution” test is properly applied involve two requirements. (i) it must be impossible for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury using the “but for” test. The impossibility must be due to factors that are outside of the plaintiff’s control; for example, current limits of scientific knowledge. (ii) it must be clear that the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, thereby exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury, and the plaintiff must have suffered that form of injury. In other words, the plaintiff’s injury must fall within the ambit of the risk created by the defendant’s breach. The Court gave the following examples requiring an exception to the “but for” test: - where it is impossible to say which of two tortious sources caused the injury, as where two shots are carelessly fired at the victim, but it is impossible to say which shot injured him. - where it is impossible to prove what a particular person in the causal chain would have done had the defendant not committed a negligent act or omission, thus breaking the “but for” chain of causation. Corresponding A l d e r s o n practice areasPersonal InjuryFire Claim LitigationProducts Liability LitigationSports LitigationIf you require legal advice about implications of recent fire litigation decisions in Ontario, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by telephone on 416 619 0086 or by email contact@alderson.ca
Personal Injury Litigation - Amusement Ride Not Common Carrier
In reasons delivered by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Mallais and McKenzie v D.A. Campbell Amusements Limited 2007 ONCA 82, Docket C43676, on February 8, 2007, the higher standard of care, and arguably the reverse onus, of a "common carrier" were held not to apply in a claim by a plaintiff injured while riding an amusement ride known as "Sky Master". In considering the decision below, where the trial judge did not charge the jury that the respondent was a common carrier, rather only on the standard law of negligence and that of the Occupiers' Liability Act R.S.O. 1990, c O.2, the Court of Appeal refused to venture into uncharted territory to find amusement ride operators akin to stagecoach operators. Preferring instead the line of American case law authority "purpose test" - that amusement rides serve a different purpose than common carriers and thus should be held to the ordinary standards of negligence, over the competing line of American case law authority "control test" - that amusement rides, like common carriers, are controlled by their operators and thus should be subject to the higher standards appplicable to common carriers, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge committed no error and dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. The reasons expressed a preference for a focus on the natural and ordinary meaning of "common carrier", which the court said was clearly reflected in the Oxford English Dictionary definition: "a person or company undertaking to transport any goods or passengers on regular routes at agreed rates". This was not a case where the element used by the patrons at the time of injury was incidental to a transportation enterprise, such as the escalator on the premises of the TTC in the case of Kauffman v Toronto Transit Commission, [1960] S.C.R. 251. The Court of Appeal thus found that the underlying policy rationale of the higher standard required by a common carrier, of the passenger being "conveyed safely to their destination" was not applicable where the the patron's expectation was a thrill, even a seemingly oxymoronic "safe thrill". Does this mean cruise lines, bus operators and the like should describe their intended conveyance to prospective passengers as "thrilling" to seek to avoid a higher standard of care? Even if the purpose is objectively determined, so that the "man on the Clapham Omnibus" can be assumed to be seeking safe conveyance through South London and not a thrill, can the purpose of an amusement easily be assumed for repeat users? Corresponding A l d e r s o n practice areasPersonal Injury
Travel, Leisure and Sports Litigation
Tranportation Litigation
If you require legal advice about implications of recent Ontario Personal Injury litigation decisions, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by telephone 416 619 0086 or by email contact@alderson.ca
International Arbitration - UAE Accedes to 1958 New York Convention - Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
By Federal Decree No 43 of 2006 the United Arab Emirates joined 137 other nations in acceding to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the so-called 1958 New York Convention). The UNCITRAL website, reports that the UAE Federal Government has deposited articles of accession with the UN on 21 August 2006 (with entry into force on 19 November, 2006). Canada acceded to the Convention in 1986 declaring that it would apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, that were considered commercial under the laws of Canada, except in the case of the Province of Quebec where the law did not provide for such limitation. Corresponding A l d e r s o n practice areas
InjunctionsInternational AssistanceOffshoreIf you require legal advice from a Toronto commercial litigation lawyer, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by telephone 416 619 0086 or by email contact@alderson.ca
Property Litigation - Cottage Litigation - Road Access
In reasons released on 2nd May, 2006 in 992275 Ontario Inc et al (Appellants) and Frank Krawczyk et al (Respondents), the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the judgment at trial in proceedings involving the effect that the provisions the Road Access Act, R.S.O. 190 c. R.34, as amended, 2001, c. 25, S. 483, have on an old bush road in Muskoka. It held that: 1. The status of a road as an access road does not depend on the use of the road by the party claiming that the road is an access road (the definition of access road in s. 1 of the Act does require that); 2. There is no statutory authority under the Act for declaring that a road is an access road to or for the benefit of particular parties; 3. There is no statutory authority under the Act for imposing conditions either permitting or restricting use of an access road (ie. specifying individuals entitled to use or stating use restrictions); 4. Evidence of significant amount of water from various sources covering an unopened road allowance (which otherwise might have provided a viable alternative access), permitting the access seeker to demonstrate impossibility of construction of a road on an unopened road allowance, triggers the prohibition of closure of the road, without a court order, in s. 2(1) of the Act under the Bogart v Thompson [2002] O.T.C. 329 (S.C.J.) test. 5. In determining whether, under s. 3(1)(b) of the Act, the court should order closure of a road, the court must make an explicit finding whether parties entitled to notice of an application to close the road have a legal right to use it. The finding that a road is an access road does not give persons whose property is served by the road a legal right to use it within the meaning of s. 3(1)(b). Corresponding A l d e r s o n practice areasIf you require legal advice about implications of recent Ontario property litigation decisions, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by by telephone 416 619 0086 or email contact@alderson.ca
Administrative Law - Ontario Boards, Commissions and Tribunals - Practice and Procedure
Links to on-line publication of rules of practice and procedure for some (not all) Ontario boards, commissions and tribuals has been added to the links section of this blog, including those in relation to: Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal
Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario
Assessment Review Board
Consent and Capacity Board
Environmental Review Tribunal
Financial Services Commission of Ontario - Advisory Board
Financial Services Commission of Ontario - Financial Services Tribunal
Financial Services Commission of Ontario - Superintendent of Financial Services
Health Services Appeal and Review Board
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
Information and Privacy Commissioner
Licence Appeal Tribunal
Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services
Ontario Energy Board
Ontario Film Review Board
Ontario Labour Relations Board
Ontario Municipal Board
Ontario Racing Commission 2005 Rules of Standardbred Racing
Ontario Racing Commission 2005 Rules of Thoroughbred Racing
Ontario Securities Commission
Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal
Workplace Safety and Insurance Board
Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal Corresponding A l d e r s o n practice areasThese links are merely for the conveninece of regulatory, administrative and licensing lawyers and is not legal advice or opinion. If you require legal advice about licensing, regulatory or administrative law and remedies, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by telephone 416 619 0086 or by email contact@alderson.ca
Negligence – Slip and Fall Injury – Occupiers’ Liability – Causation Analysis
In reasons released today, 8th February, 2006, in Kamin v. Kawartha Dairy Limited, the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the plaintiff’s appeal against the decision of the trial judge that, whilst the defendant failed to meet the standard in subsection 3(1) of the Occupiers’ Liability Act R.S.O. 1990, cO.2, the plaintiff’s claim for damages arising from a fall while walking in the defendant’s parking lot should be dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff did not know the precise location in the parking lot where she fell or how she fell. In setting aside the judgment of the trial judge and, pursuant to subsection 134(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.C.43, entering judgment for the plaintiff, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in her causation analysis in setting too high an onus on the plaintiff (the Cook v Windsor, [1944] 2 D.L.R, 778 (Ont. H.C.) onus on a plaintiff of establishing where she fell) and erred in failing to find or draw the only reasonable inference, that on all the evidence the respondent’s negligence caused or materially contributed to the appellant’s fall and resulting injury. In describing the law respecting proof of causation, Borins J said: “While Windsor may have represented the state of the law respecting proof of causation 60 years ago, it has been replaced on this issue by Snell v Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 at paras 29 and 30, where it was held that causation need not be determined by scientific precision. At para 29, Sopinka J. adopted the following statement of Lord Salmon in Alphacell Ltd. v Woodward, [1972] 2 All E.R. 475 at p 490 in which he held that causation is “…essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered by ordinary common sense rather than metaphysical theory””. Corresponding A l d e r s o n practice areasIf you require legal advice about implications of recent Ontario Personal Injury and Occupiers' Liability litigation decisions, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by telephone 416 619 0086 or by email contact@alderson.ca
International Litigation Lawyers Library - Attachment of Assets - Mareva Injunctions / Freezing Orders
David Alderson has co-authored two chapters of Attachment of Assets, N.Y., Juris, looseleaf, edited by Lawrence W. Newman, Senior Partner and former Chairman of the Litigation Department, Baker & McKenzie, New York. This book includes chapters by practitioners from leading firms in over 50 countries. David Alderson co-authored the Bermuda chapter with Narinder Hargun whilst practising as a barrister and attorney with Conyers Dill & Pearman in Bermuda; and the U.A.E. chapter with Maali Qassem whilst practising as an attorney with Afridi and Angell in Dubai. The Canada chapter was written by J. Brian Casey and Lisa Douglas, both of Baker & McKenzie. Juris includes the following in their online description of this book: Attachment of Assets is designed to give practical information and guidance to lawyers and businessmen who are interested in securing expected future judgments and in making strategic decisions concerning the deployment of moveable assets in the face of possible attachments of them. The chapters, each discussing the requirements of a separate country, are written by lawyers with practical expertise in this field.
The procedure by which attachments are obtained vary, ranging from court orders authorizing a court official to take custody of a defendant’s assets to orders restraining the defendant from transferring his assets. The effects of such orders differ as well: some create a lien superior to those of other creditors and others do no more than immobilize the debtor’s assets, leaving them open to being levied upon by later-arriving judgment creditors. Corresponding A l d e r s o n practice areas If you require legal advice from a Toronto commercial litigation lawyer, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by telephone 416 619 0086 or by email contact@alderson.ca
Employment Litigation in Ontario – Wrongful Dismissal – Inducement – Disability During Reasonable Notice Period
In reasons released on 10th January, 2006 in Alcatel Canada Inc.(Appellant) v Mary Egan (Respondent), the Ontario Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge finding a nine month notice period for wrongful dismissal based on twenty months of employment, where the trial judge found, without error, that the plaintiff was “encouraged” by two former colleagues and long-time friends: -to leave longstanding secure employment of some twenty years; and -to give serious consideration to seeking employment with the defendant at a very significant increase in salary, plus a bonus and stock option; where: -unbeknownst to the plaintiff at the time of hiring the two former colleagues and long-time friends shared a bonus paid by the defendant for their efforts upon the hiring of the plaintiff; -the plaintiff had no particular interest in leaving her employment; and -it could reasonably be inferred that both sides anticipated and expected a lengthy term of employment; The Court of Appeal criticized interchanging the use of words the “encouraging”, “inducements” and “enticed” and cautioned avoidance in concluding inducement in virtually any new hire, distinguishing this case from one where a prospective employee was being recruited by a head-hunter – who is not a former colleague and long-time friend and who is known to the employee to be getting paid for his or her efforts. It held that the trial judge properly directed himself by heeding the caution of Iacobucci J. in Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd. (1997) 152 (4th) 1 S.C.C. (hereafter “ Wallace”) that not all “inducements” will carry equal weight and found that it was open to the trial judge to find that this case fell within the concept of inducement described in Wallace as where the employer has induced the employee to “quit a secure, well-paying job…on the strength of promises of career advancement and greater responsibility, security and compensation with the new organization”. The Court of Appeal agreed that the defendant wrongfully discontinued the plaintiff’s disability insurance coverage prior to the onset of a disability and held that where an employee would otherwise have qualified for disability benefits during the reasonable notice period, but the application is denied on the basis that coverage was wrongfully discontinued by her employer, the employer must be liable for the value of the disability benefits that would otherwise have been payable. It upheld the decision that the plaintiff was not entitled to receive both damages for wrongful dismissal and disability benefits, but found that the trial judge had erred in granting the plaintiff full salary for the entire notice period, since the plaintiff would thusly be overpaid salary and underpaid disability benefits. The Court of Appeal reasoned that to keep a wrongfully dismissed employee “whole” during the entire reasonable notice period it should withdraw the award of full salary for the six month period during which the plaintiff’s disability and reasonable notice overlap, but award disability benefits for twelve months. Corresponding A l d e r s o n practice areasIf you require legal advice about implications of recent Ontario commercial litigation decisions, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by telephone 416 619 0086 or by email contact@alderson.ca
Arbitration in Ontario - Appointment of Arbitrator - Judicial Intervention
In Ontario v Ontario First Nations Limited 2004 CanLII 34913 (ON C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the limits of the statutory authority of the court to define the arbitrator's jurisdiction on an application to appoint an arbitrator pursuant to the Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. c17 (the " Arbitration Act"). The Court of Appeal held that: -the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Unifund Assurance Co. v Insurance Corp of British Columbia [2003] 2 S.C.R. 63 goes beyond merely carving out an exception to the general rule that the arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction for those cases in which constitutionality of the arbitration itself is under attack; -under the Arbitration Act an arbitrator has permissive (non-exclusive) authority to determine questions of jurisdiction in the first instance and generally is the most appropriate body to decide questions of jurisdiction in the first instance; and whilst there is greater scope for the court to intervene under the Arbitration Act than there is under the Model Law (and the International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990, c19), the purposes permitted by section 6 of the Arbitration Act should be construed narrowly in accordance with the objective of that section to restrain judicial intervention; and -when the application for the appointment of the arbitrator was heard and the parties then sought and were granted leave to make submissions about the terms of the order of appointment, the court correctly decided on a form of the order which left it open to the arbitrator to hear submissions from the parties and to decide the scope of the arbitration. Corresponding A l d e r s o n practice areasIf you require legal advice about implications of recent Ontario commercial litigation decisions, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by telephone 416 619 0086 or by email contact@alderson.ca
International Litigation - Enforcement of Foreign Judgment in Ontario - Singapore Judgment
The Morguard Investments Ltd. v De Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 standard -that the court granting the judgment sought to be enforced properly assumed jurisdiction because of its real and substantial connection to the underlying cause of action - as applied by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Beals v Saldanha [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416 to a foreign judgment - without considering the quality of justice of the foreign jurisdiction before the stage at which defences are argued - was recently applied by the Superior Court of Justice in Oakwell Engineering Ltd. v Enernorth Industries Inc. 76 O.R. (3d) 528. In an application for enforcement in Ontario of a judgment after a defended action before the High Court of Singapore, affirmed by the Singapore Court of Appeal; cross-application for a declaration that the judgment is not enforceable: the Superior Court of Justice held that: -historically, there is no evidence of bias or unfairness by the Singapore court in private commercial proceedings; -there is no evidence of bias or unfairness by the Singapore Court in this specific case; and -there was a real and substantial connection of the action to Singapore and no defences to enforcement were made out. Corresponding A l d e r s o n practice areas If you require legal advice about implications of recent Ontario commercial litigation decisions, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by telephone 416 619 0086 or by email contact@alderson.ca
Insurance Litigation - Vacancy Exclusion - Fire Insurance - Statutory Condition 4
Coming soon - a review of the Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Royal Bank of Canada v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,[2005] 1 S.C.R. 779, 2005 SCC 34 and Marche v. Halifax Insurance Co.,[2005] 1 S.C.R. 47, 2005 SCC Corresponding A l d e r s o n practice areas If you require legal advice about implications of recent Ontario commercial litigation decisions, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by telephone 416 619 0086 or by email contact@alderson.ca
Welcome to Alderson's Back of Envelope Commercial Litigation in Ontario Blog
This is the inaugural post to the Commercial Litigation in Ontario Blog. Whilst I was reluctant to start a law blog , the success of the www.citynotary.ca blog since its launch in March 2005, suggests that some blogs are read. So here goes... Disclaimer: by accessing, using or remaining on this blog you signify and communicate your agreement to and acceptance of a binding agreement the terms and conditions of which are set out in the legal notice posted on www.alderson.ca. If you require legal advice about implications of recent Ontario commercial litigation decisions, please contact David Alderson, Barrister & Solicitor, at Alderson, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada by email contact@alderson.caAlderson is dedicated to effective and efficient advice and representation in commercial litigation, employment litigation, entertainment litigation, banking litigation, international litigation, maritime, marine, shipping and admiralty litigation, transportation litigation, insurance and reinsurance litigation, personal injury litigation, business litigation and other commercial and civil litigation matters.
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